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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the emergence and institutionalization of a new international norm supporting greater access to lifesaving drugs in developing countries, particularly for HIV/AIDS drugs in South Africa. In order to decrease the price of life-saving HIV/AIDS drugs, the government of South Africa passed amendments allowing for the domestic production of generics and the importation of more aﬀordable HIV/AIDS drugs. Although these amendments were arguably in compliance with international laws governing the protection of intellectual property rights, the United States government and a worldwide coalition of pharmaceutical companies opposed the legislation and actively sought its repeal. Over time, however, the positions of both the U.S. government and the pharmaceutical companies changed in response to a growing worldwide awareness of the HIV/AIDS crisis in South Africa. Activist groups played a key role in mobilizing public sentiment in support of greater access to HIV/AIDS drugs. Largely due to the concerted campaigns of activist groups, the norm was institutionalized in bilateral relations between U.S. and South Africa, as well as in international statements such as the Doha Declaration. However, the norm has failed to become completely internalized within South Africa’s domestic political sphere. To this day, the HIV/AIDS problem in South Africa continues relatively unabated.
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Shocking the Conscience of the World:
International Norms and the Access to AIDS Treatment in South Africa
South Africa has the largest number of people living with HIV/AIDS in the world.1 More than 95% of people
infected with HIV live in the developing world, including more than 25 million in sub-Saharan Africa.2 By
the end of 1999, an estimated 4,100,000 people, or just under 20% of the South African population were
1See AIDS in Africa Website (visited Apr. 20, 2002) <http://www.avert.org/aafrica.htm>.
2See European Parliament Resolution on Access to Drugs for HIV/AIDS Victims in the Third World, Para-
graph A, 2001 O.J. (44) 343, 300-30, available at Eur-Lex (visited Apr.15, 2002) <http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/en/archive/2001/c 34320011205en.html.> [hereinafter European Parliament Resolution].
5estimated to be living with HIV or AIDS.3 In 1999, an estimated 250,000 people died of AIDS in South
Africa.4 Each 15-year-old in South Africa has a 50% risk of becoming infected and dying from AIDS,5 and
1,600 people contract HIV each day in the country.6 Anti-retroviral drugs have already reduced the number
of AIDS deaths in Europe and the USA by 75%, but the price of these drugs keeps these medicines out of
reach of millions of infected people, notably in Africa.7
In response to this looming health crisis, the South African government made legislative changes in 1998
that allowed more ﬂexibility in the rules governing the domestic production of generic AIDS drugs and im-
portation of foreign generic AIDS drugs. The purpose of these changes was to reduce the price of drugs so
that they could become more aﬀordable for the South African population.
Although the United States initially opposed amendments, the U.S. government came to eventually accept
them, albeit in a conditional manner. This presented a “turning point in U.S. policy toward the global
HIV/AIDS pandemic.”8 A worldwide coalition of pharmaceutical companies, which initially responded to
the legislative changes by suing the South African government in a South African court, dropped their lawsuit
and reduced prices for several AIDS drugs. Over time, the positions of both the United States government
and the pharmaceutical companies changed in response to an “unparalleled global coalition” supporting
greater access to AIDS drugs.9 This sentiment was articulated through widespread eﬀorts and campaigns –
by NGOs, international organizations, as well as in the media.
3See AIDS in Africa Website (visited Apr. 20, 2002) <http://www.avert.org/subaadults.htm>. The ﬁgures are estimates at
the end of 1999, published by UNAIDS in the Report on the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic June 2000. They include all people
with HIV infection, whether or not they have developed symptoms of AIDS, alive at the end of 1999. The ﬁgures are estimates
based on several sources of information, rather then exact counts of infections.
4See AIDS in Africa Website (visited Apr. 20, 2002) <http://www.avert.org/subadeaths.htm>. The ﬁgures are the estimates
at the end of 1999, published by UNAIDS in the Report on the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic June 2000. The ﬁgures are
estimates based on a number of diﬀerent sources of information, rather then exact counts of infections.
5See European Parliament Resolution, supra note 2, at para. B.
6See George Ayittey, AIDS Scourge Saps Africa’s Vitality, The Financial Gazette, Apr. 18, 2002, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, ALLNEWS ﬁle.
7See European Parliament Resolution, supra note 2, at para. C.
8J. Stephen Morrison, U.S. Policy Towards HIV/AIDS in Africa: Momentum, Opportunities, and Urgent Choices, in Africa
Policy in the Clinton Years: Critical Choices for the Bush Administration 18, 13-33 (J. Stephen Morrison et al. eds., 2001.
9See Amit Sen Gupta, Jana Swasthya Abhiyan (Peoples Health Movement), India, A Long Road to Travel: Declaration on
TRIPS at Doha (visited Mar. 1, 2002) <http://lists.kabissa.org/pipermail/pha-exchange/2001-December/000092.html>.
6International reactions to the HIV/AIDS crisis in South Africa played a key role in the emergence and
institutionalization of a new norm. This new norm can be stated as follows: even at the expense of the
pharmaceutical companies’ proﬁts, developing countries should be allowed to adjust their own domestic
legal regimes to allow for generic production or the importation of generics in order to make lifesaving phar-
maceuticals aﬀordable for their population. While initially rejected by pharmaceutical companies and some
industrialized countries, the norm began to ﬁnd acceptance over the span of less than ten years.
In the ﬁrst pivotal negotiations on global access to HIV/AIDS drugs at Geneva, Switzerland in 1991 phar-
maceutical companies refused to budge on the issue of patent protection.10 They also did not want to lower
drug prices, and argued that it was the responsibility of governments to ensure that those in need received
necessary treatments. The talks ended in 1993.11 Less than ten years later, pharmaceutical companies were
willing to assume a diﬀerent position. In 2000, ﬁve major pharmaceutical companies issued a joint statement
with the UN, in which they acknowledged that “aﬀordability is an issue in developing countries.”12 In 2001,
the international community aﬃrmed this commitment when over 140 countries gathered together at the
World Trade Organization meetings in Doha, Qatar and approved a declaration that allows countries to
override pharmaceutical patents to gain faster, cheaper access to medicines in certain situations, as when
poor nations want access to patented drugs.
This paper examines the emergence and institutionalization of this new norm supporting greater access to
lifesaving drugs for developing countries, particularly for HIV/AIDS drugs in sub-Saharan Africa. The ﬁrst
section enumerates the basic components of norm theory, which originates in political science. While political
scientists have examined the emergence of international norms, such as the normative consensus against the
use of landmines, this paper focuses on the international norm that developing countries should be allowed to
10See Barton Gellman, An Unequal Calculus of Life and Death, Wash. Post, Dec. 27, 2000, at A1 [hereinafter Unequal
Calculus].
11See Unequal Calculus, supra note 10, at A1.
12See id. at A1
7adjust their own domestic legal regime to allow for generic production or the importation of goods in order
to make lifesaving pharmaceuticals aﬀordable for their population. The second section summarizes the basic
international legal framework for the protection of intellectual property rights and attempts to reconcile the
norm with existing international laws. The third section examines the legislative changes South Africa made
in response to its HIV/AIDS crisis; the legislative response was the country’s attempt to institutionalize the
norm in its domestic laws. The fourth and ﬁfth sections analyze the response to these changes by the U.S.
government and a worldwide coalition of pharmaceutical companies; the U.S. and the pharmaceutical com-
panies challenged the basis for the norm’s adoption and sought the withdrawal of the law. The ﬁnal sections
will demonstrate that, while the norm has been institutionalized in various forms, political obstacles within
South Africa as well as other practical factors have prevented its full internalization, and many segments of
the population are still without aﬀordable HIV/AIDS drugs. Furthermore, developing countries continue to
face various obstacles to making legislative changes necessary to reduce drug prices.
I. Application of Norm Theory to the Debate on Drug Prices
Norm theory provides a useful theoretical tool to understand how ideas and moral assessments can lead to
political change in the international arena, including the signiﬁcant shift in the international arena regarding
access to HIV/AIDS drugs. Political scientists deﬁne norms as standards regarding appropriate or proper
behavior. Norms embody a quality of “oughtness” or “shared moral assessment.”13 They “prompt justiﬁ-
cations for action, and leave an extensive trail of communication among actors that we can study.”14 The
key norm in this discussion is the belief that developing countries should be allowed to create ﬂexible legal
13Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 International Organiza-
tions 887, 891 (Autumn 1998).
14Id. at 892.
8regimes that allow generic domestic production or importation of foreign generic drugs in order to reduce
the cost of pharmaceuticals needed by their population.
Scholars have proposed a three-stage process for understanding norms: norm emergence, broad norm ac-
ceptance or a “norm cascade”, and norm internalization. In the ﬁrst stage of norm emergence, norm en-
trepreneurs “attempt to convince a critical mass of states (norm leaders) to embrace new norms.”15 They call
attention to issues or even “create” issues by using language that names, interprets, and dramatizes them.
They face ﬁrmly embedded norms and frames that create alternative perceptions of both appropriateness
and interest. Norm promoters construct “cognitive frames” that, when successful, “resonate with broader
public understandings and are adopted as new ways of talking about and understanding issues.”16 All norm
promoters at the international level promote their norms through an organizational platform.17
Activist nongovernmental organizations have been the primary norm entrepreneurs who have marched, lob-
bied, editorialized, and even sued in order to increase public attention on the issue of public access to drugs.
The primary organizations have included Doctors Without Borders, the Consumer Project on Technology,
which was founded by Ralph Nader in 1995,18 and the Global Treatment Access Campaign, which is a con-
sortium of organizations including a South African organization called Treatment Action Campaign, ACT
UP/New York, and the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission.19 These activist orga-
nizations have used a variety of tools to increase awareness as well as to inﬂuence the political process. The
website of the Consumer Project on Technology, which is located at www.cptech.org, for example, contains
an exhaustive collection of articles, oﬃcial documents, and commentary regarding the pricing debate.
These norm promoters faced ﬁrmly embedded norms in the arguments oﬀered by pharmaceutical companies.
The companies have argued that infringement on their patent rights will reduce the quality and quantity of
15Id. at 900.
16Id. at 897.
17Id. at 899.
18About the Consumer Project on Technology (visited April 1, 2002) <http://www.cptech.org/about.html>.
19Global Treatment Access Campaign Website (visited April 1, 2002) <http://www.globaltreatmentaccess.org>.
9much-needed research and development eﬀorts. They have also asserted that even if the cost of drugs were
reduced, most countries do not have the infrastructure, personnel, and funding needed to properly distribute
them and to instruct people on how to use them,20 and that prevention, rather than medication, is the only
genuine solution to the AIDS crisis. The pharmaceutical companies had superior resources to voice these
counter-norms. They had closer connections with key U.S. government oﬃcials, as well as the money needed
to lobby for needed action, to conduct high-end media campaigns, and to bring suit in South African court.
In spite of the superior ﬁnancial resources of the pharmaceutical companies, the activist groups were success-
ful in helping to inﬂuence the ultimate outcome of the bilateral tug-of-war between the United States and
South Africa regarding patent protection of pharmaceuticals. Norm entrepreneurs in the activist groups were
vocal opponents of the U.S. government actions opposing the law, as well as the lawsuit brought by pharma-
ceutical companies against the government of South Africa. The norm entrepreneurs ended up capturing the
attention of the press, international organizations, and politicians, and the norm became institutionalized in
various government statements and international documents.
Institutionalizing a norm is a critical step between the ﬁrst and second stage of international norm dynamics.
The ﬁrst two stages are divided by a “tipping point”, at which a critical mass of relevant state actors adopt
the norm. For an emergent norm to move to the second stage, it must become institutionalized in speciﬁc
sets of international rules and organizations. By clarifying what, exactly, the norm is and what constitutes
violation, institutionalization contributes to the possibility of norm cascade, the second stage in norm devel-
opment.21
The second stage is characterized by a more dynamic of imitation as the norm leaders attempt to socialize
other states to become norm followers. More countries begin to adopt the norm even without domestic
pressure for change. Norm cascades occur through a process of “international socialization” intended to in-
20See Susan King Finston, Patents, Poverty, and Public Health: Two Perspectives on the Treatment of AIDS in Africa, 1
Global Perspectives: A Forum on Business in Transition and Emerging Markets 16, 18 (Winter 2002).
21See Finnemore and Sikkink, supra note 13, at 900.
10duce norm breakers to become norm followers.22 In the international scene, socialization involves diplomatic
praise or censure, either bilateral or multilateral, which is reinforced by material sanctions and incentives.
This process of “international socialization” occurred in the negotiations between developing and developed
countries in the WTO meetings, during which the countries agreed to sign the Doha Declaration.
In the third stage of norm internalization, norms have a “taken-for-granted quality” and “no longer are a
matter of public debate.”23 They become so widely accepted that conforming with the norm becomes auto-
matic. This paper argues that while the norm of increased access to AIDS drugs has completed the ﬁrst two
stages of emergence and institutionalization, it has yet to realize the third stage of norm internalization. The
main proponents of the alternative norm, the pharmaceutical companies, did not face a complete loss. The
international statements that clariﬁed and stated the new norm left considerable latitude for pharmaceutical
companies to preserve some of their patent rights. Furthermore, those international statements are general
enough to allow for future debate and change. Finally, domestic actors within South Africa have failed to
take steps necessary to radically improve access.
II. International Framework for the Protection of Intellectual Property
The Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (“TRIPS”), the broadest international intellec-
tual property agreement, was signed as part of the Uruguay Round of the GATT on April 15, 1994.24 The
TRIPS negotiations reconciled the dramatically diﬀerent interests of industrialized and developing countries.
22See id. at 902.
23See id. at 904.
24See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L. M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPS Agreement].
11In general, the United States and other industrialized countries favored the creation of international stan-
dards for the protection of intellectual property, while developing countries argued that intellectual property
should be a matter of solely domestic concern.
A. International Legal Regime Prior to TRIPS
The two main intellectual property agreements preceding TRIPS were the Paris Convention for the Protection
of Industrial Property and the Berne Convention on Copyrights. Originally adopted in 1883 and subsequently
modiﬁed in 1967, the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property protected a variety of
industrial property, including the rights of patent holders.25 The Paris Convention, however, did not impose
obligations on a member country to protect the rights of foreigners if the member country did not grant
protection to its own nationals.26 As a result, member countries could easily circumvent the Convention’s
requirements by universally withholding protection of intellectual property.27
Originally adopted in 1887 and most recently modiﬁed in 1971, the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works established protection for the rights of copyright owners’ technical and creative
material.28 Like the Paris Convention, the Berne Convention was criticized for its limitations, including the
failure to devise provisions for empowering intellectual property holders to enforce their rights and resolve
disputes.29
Both the Paris Convention and the Berne Convention were administered by the United Nations-aﬃliated
World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”), which was established by the Stockholm Convention
25See Frank Romano, International Conventions and Treaties, 536 PLI/Pat 545, 557 (1998), cited in Naomi Bass, Note:
Implications of the TRIPS Agreement for Developing Countries: Pharmaceutical Patent Laws in Brazil and South Africa in
the 21st Century, 34 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 191, 195 n. 18-20 (2002).
26See id.
27See id.
28See Romano, supra note 25, at 552.
29See id. at 553.
12of 1967.30 WIPO failed, however, to create an eﬀective regime for the protection of intellectual property,31
which led industrialized countries, such as the United States, to seek the inclusion of intellectual property
issues at the Uruguay Round negotiations of the General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (“GATT”).32
The position of the United States was strongly inﬂuenced by the pharmaceutical industry. Pharmaceutical
industry groups played a key role in advising the United States Trade Representative (“USTR”) throughout
the negotiations on TRIPS.33 They argued that patent protection was important for two key reasons: ﬁrst,
industry representatives contended that inadequate patent protection cost U.S. manufacturers billions of
dollars in annual sales.34 Second, they argued that strong intellectual property protections would promote
economic development; patent rights would beneﬁt developing countries by encouraging foreign and domestic
investment in research and by enabling high technology companies to engage in technology transfer with
them.35
Developing countries strongly favored WIPO negotiations over revisions to international intellectual prop-
erty obligations.36 Until 1989, countries such as India, Brazil, Argentina, and Thailand had opposed even
the inclusion of the issue of intellectual property on the multilateral trade negotiating agenda because, they
argued, the subject of intellectual property rights was not a trade issue.37 Domestic laws on intellectual
property should not be linked with trade, they insisted, and countries should be permitted to develop their
30See Theresa Beeby Lewis, Patent Protection for the Pharmaceutical Industry: A Survey of Patent Laws of Various Coun-
tries, 30 Int’l Law. 835, 841-42 (1996).
31See Bass, supra note 25, at 195.
32See Robert Weissman, A Long, Strange TRIPS: The Pharmaceutical Industry Drive to Harmonize Global Intellectual
Property Rules, and the Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives Available to Third World Countries, 17 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L.
1069, 1078 (1996).
33See Robert Weissman, Patent Plunder: TRIPping the Third World, Multinational Monitor, at 8 (Nov. 1990).
34See Al Wyss, Patent Protection Winning New Round, Chemical Marketing Rep., Mar. 19, 1999, at SR 22 (citing many of
the studies used by the industry), cited in Weissman, supra note 32, at 1086 n. 95.
35See Richard T. Rapp and Richard P. Rozek, Beneﬁts and Costs of Intellectual Property Protection in Developing Countries,
J. of World Trade, Oct. 1990, at 75, 77-81.
36See Craig Edgar, Note, Patenting Nature: GATT on a Hot Tin Roof, 34 Washburn L. J. 76, 98 n. 54 (1994).
37See Gupta, supra note 9.
13intellectual property laws in accordance with their own stage of economic development and technological
progress.38 Developing countries feared that laws providing strong patent protection would threaten the
ability of developing countries to “catch up” to already-developed countries, such as Japan and Canada,
whose economic development greatly beneﬁted from weak patent protection of technology.39 According to
developing countries, it was unfair to impose a uniform patent structure upon all countries of the globe,
irrespective of their stage of development.40
B. Overview of TRIPS
In spite of opposition from developing countries, TRIPS was passed during the GATT negotiations. Ex-
panding upon existing obligations under the Paris Convention, the Berne Convention, and WIPO, TRIPS
establishes minimum protection standards for copyrights, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial
designs, patents, layout-designs of integrated circuits, and undisclosed information including trade secrets
and test dates. 41 TRIPS is a major departure from preexisting conventions on intellectual property rights
in that it contains detailed provisions on enforcement: the Agreement stipulates speciﬁc obligations related
to evidence, injunction, damages, counterfeiting, and penalties for infringement.42 Member states, and not
private parties, can address non-compliance with TRIPS obligations under the multilateral procedures es-
tablished by the Dispute Settlement Understanding.43
TRIPS sets forth the minimum standards to be applied by all members of the WTO. Member countries
cannot, in the speciﬁc areas and issues covered by the Agreement, confer a lower level of protection than
provided under the Agreement.44 At the same time, members cannot be obliged to provide “more extensive”
38See id.
39See id.
40See id.
41See Carlos M. Correa, Intellectual Property Rights, the WTO, and Developing Countries: The TRIPS Agreement and
Policy Options 1 (2000).
42See Correa, supra note 41, at 2.
43See id.
44See Correa, supra note 41, at 8.
14protection.45 In accordance with Article 1 of the Agreement, “Members may, but shall not be obliged to,
implement in their law more extensive protection than is required by this Agreement, provided that such
protection does not contravene the provision of this Agreement. Members shall be free to determine the
appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system and
practice.”46
Developing countries negotiated with industrialized countries for a transitional arrangement, under which
developing countries would have additional time until which TRIPS obligations became applicable.47 De-
veloping countries have ﬁve years after the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement to apply the
obligations relating to intellectual property protection. The obligations concerning national and most-favored
nation treatment become applicable one year after the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement.48
A further ﬁve years is contemplated for countries that are bound to introduce patent protection in areas of
technology not so protected in their territory on the general date of application of the TRIPS Agreement
for these countries.49
Despite the arguments of developing countries, the ﬁnal TRIPS Agreement ultimately did contain U.S.-style
patent laws.50 Signatories to TRIPS must provide patent protection for inventions “in all ﬁelds of technol-
ogy.”51 An exception to this is that patent need not be granted for “diagnostic, therapeutic, and surgical
methods for the treatment of humans and animals.”52 Although this phrase could be construed to mean
that drugs need not be protected by patents, Article 70(8) of TRIPS requires member countries to set up a
means of collecting applications for pharmaceutical patents. The rights granted under patents include the
45TRIPS Agreement, supra note 24, at art. 1.
46Id.
47See Correa, supra note 41, at 9.
48See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 24, at art. 65.2
49See id. at art. 65.4.
50See Weissman, supra note 32, at 1096.
51TRIPS Agreement, supra note 24, at art. 27(1).
52TRIPS Agreement, supra note 24, at art. 27(3)(a).
15right to prevent third parties from making, using, oﬀering for sale, selling, or importing the product without
the consent of the patentee.53
However, there are a number of exceptions and loopholes that give countries substantial leeway, although
not as much as they had before TRIPS, to experiment with diﬀerent patent schemes.54 The two loopholes
that have ﬁgured prominently in the debate over access to pharmaceuticals are ones that provide for parallel
imports and compulsory licensing.
C. TRIPS Provisions on Parallel Imports
Parallel importing occurs when a distributor buys a product in a country where it is sold at a low price, with or without patent protection, and resells it without authorization in a second country in direct competition with the patentee or authorized distributor.55
Parallel importers normally sell the product for less than the patentee.56 The issue of parallel imports generated lots of disagreement in TRIPS negotiations and was speciﬁcally left unresolved.57
Some commentators believe that because TRIPS fails to address the issue of parallel licensing, it is therefore permissible under TRIPS.58
The relevant provisions of TRIPS that pertain to parallel imports are Article 6 and Article 28:Article 6:
Article 6 of TRIPS says that “nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion
of intellectual property rights.”59 The phrase “exhaustion of patent rights” refers to the practice of parallel
53TRIPS Agreement, supra note 24, at art. 28(1)(a).
54See Weissman, supra note 32, at 1096.
55See Alexander J. Stack, TRIPS, Patent Exhaustion and Parallel Imports, 1 J. of World Intell. Prop., 657, 666-667 (1998).
56See David Perkins, et al., Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights, 574 PLI/Pat. 41, 46 (1999).
57See Claude E. Barﬁeld and Mark A. Groombridge, Parallel Trade in the Pharmaceutical Industry: Implications for Inno-
vation, Consumer Welfare, and Health Policy, 10 Fordham Intell. Prop.Media & Ent. L. J. 185, 190 (1999).
58See Duane Nash, South Africa’s Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act of 1997, 15 Berkeley Tech.
L.J. 485, 494 (2000).
59TRIPS Agreement, supra note 24, at art. 6.
16importing. According to the doctrine of exhaustion, a patentee has no right to control the use or resale of
goods that he has put on the market or has allowed a licensee to market.60 Since Article 6 speciﬁes that
nothing in TRIPS addresses this issue, it suggests that the decision of whether to permit parallel importing
is left to each individual country. If a country decides that the ﬁrst sale of a product anywhere in the world
exhausts the rights of a patentee, then parallel importing is allowed. However, if a country decides that the
ﬁrst sale of a product within the country in which it is patented exhausts the patentee’s rights, then parallel
importing is not allowed.61
Article 28:
However, there is considerable debate about the meaning of Article 6. Article 28 of TRIPS is often used
to shed light on the meaning of Article 6.62 Under Article 28, a patentee has exclusive right under TRIPS
“to prevent third parties not having his consent from acts of: making, using, oﬀering for sale, selling or
importing.”63 This provision might be construed to limit parallel importing, but a footnote to this provision
says that it is subject to provisions of Article 6. Therefore, the exclusive right of importation in Article
28 is limited by the principle of international exhaustion. Interpreting Articles 6 and 28 in conjunction,
whenever a patentee’s rights are exhausted in any country, he has lost the right to prevent importation by
a non-authorized party.64
D. TRIPS Provisions on Compulsory Licenses
Compulsory licenses are permitted under TRIPS under certain conditions. Compulsory licensing occurs when a country that grants a patent on a product grants a third party the right to produce this patented product without the patent holder’s consent. In other words, a compulsory license is “an involuntary contract between a willing buyer and an unwilling seller imposed and enforced by the state.” 65
60Correa, supra note 41, at 81.
61See id.
62See Rosemary Sweeney, Comment: The U.S. Push for Worldwide Patent Protection for Drugs Meets the AIDS Crisis in
Thailand: A Devastating Coalition, 9 Pac. Rim L. & Pol’y 445, 456 (2000).
63TRIPS Agreement, supra note 24, at art. 28.
64See Correa, supra note 41, at 84.
65Gianna Julian-Arnold, International Compulsory Licensing: The Rationales and the Reality, 33 IDEA 349 (1993), reprinted
17Article 31Compulsory licenses are permissible under TRIPS under some situations. Article 31, which is entitled “Other Uses Without the Authorization of the Right Holder”, enumerates eleven criteria that a government must satisfy before issuing a compulsory license.66
Before compelling a patent-holder to license his rights to generic manufacturers in exchange for monetary compensation, a government must “have attempted to obtain authorization from the patent holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and ...such eﬀorts remained unsuccessful after a reasonable period of time.”67
The right holder must be paid adequate remuneration taking into account the economic value of authorization.68
The compulsory license should be authorized “predominantly for the use of the domestic market of the Member authorizing the compulsory license.” 69
Article 31 speciﬁes that any compulsory license is limited to the purpose for which it is authorized,70 is non-exclusive,71
and is non-assignable.72 Article 31, however, does not explicitly deﬁne the qualifying events that justify the application of compulsory licensing.73
According to Article 31(b), the requirement of obtaining authorization from the patent holder can be waived in the case of a “national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use.”74
In such a situation, however, the patent holder should be notiﬁed “as soon as reasonably practicable.”75 In the case of public non-commercial use, where the government or contractor, without making a patent search, knows or has demonstrable grounds to know that a valid patent is or will be used by or for the government, the right holder shall be informed promptly.76
Compulsory licensing presents a unique opportunity for countries encountering national health crises such as AIDS to manufacture necessary medicines, irrespective of any existing patents, provided the producer of the generic product remits appropriate payment to the patent owner for use of the technology.77
There are a number of other articles in TRIPS under which developing countries could create more ﬂexible patent regimes:Article 8 Article 8 provides that members may adopt measures “necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development.” Such measures, however, must be consistent with the other provisions of TRIPS.78
Article 30Article 30 potentially provides very broad exceptions to the patent requirements of TRIPS. It permits members to provide “limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent.”79
There are three limitations to this provision: exceptions must be “limited.”80 Second, the exceptions cannot “unreasonably conﬂict with a normal exploitation of the patent.”81
And third, the exception must not “unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner.”82
Article 27Article 27 permits exclusion from patentability where necessary to protect public health and the environment.83
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73Karl Vick, African AIDS Victims Losers of a Drug War, Wash. Post, Dec. 4, 1999, at A 18, cited in Bass, supra note 25,
at 199 n. 53.
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18However, the denial of patentability must be linked to a denial of commercial exploitation.84 This provision, commonly known as the “public health provision,” allows developing countries to deny patentability for certain drugs. However, they must produce and distribute them non-commercially through a state-owned marketing board, quasi-state entity, single non-proﬁt manufacturer, or system of non-proﬁt manufacturers.85
E. Summary
In sum, TRIPS does not contravene a norm favoring increased access to life-saving drugs. Arguably, its
provisions allow for parallel imports and compulsory licensing, which have been used successfully in the past
to lower the price of drugs. However, although TRIPS does not explicitly contradict a norm favoring increased
access to drugs, many countries have not successfully invoked TRIPS provisions to reduce drug prices. This
is because the U.S. government, heavily inﬂuenced by pharmaceutical interests, has used trade pressures on
developing countries, thereby limiting the extent to which developing countries can make liberal use of TRIPS
provisions to reduce drug prices. The United States has also argued for a very restrictive interpretation of
these provisions.
Thailand’s experience illustrates this point. Thailand’s 1992 Amendments provided patent protection for
all pharmaceutical drugs for the ﬁrst time in the country’s history, but provided liberal opportunities for
compulsory licensing and parallel importing.86 According to commentators, these amendments were legal
under TRIPS; however, the United States pressured the country to pass 1999 amendments, which narrowed
opportunities for compulsory licensing and virtually eliminated parallel importing.87 These amendments
were made in response to U.S. pressure for fear that the Thai government would lose access to the U.S.
market, Thailand’s principal export market.88
Prior to the South African crisis, international norms favored access to live-saving drugs, but the patent
rights of pharmaceuticals, and the receptiveness of the U.S. government to these concerns, greatly limited
the inﬂuence these norms had on actual outcomes.
84Id..
85See Weissman, supra note 32, at 1101.
86See Sweeney, supra note 62, at 449 n. 36-38.
87See id. at 462.
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19III. South Africa’s Legislative Response to the HIV/AIDS Crisis
A. Background
South Africa has the largest number of people living with HIV/AIDS in the world.89 By the end of 1999,
an estimated 4,100,000 people, or 19.94% of the South African population were estimated to be living with
HIV or AIDS.90 In 1999, an estimated 250,000 people died of AIDS in South Africa.91
There are multiple roots of the HIV/AIDS crisis in South Africa. After Nelson Mandela came to power
in South Africa, his party, the African National Congress, made a variety of legal reforms.92 However, the
country’s patent laws were left intact.93 This strong system of patent protection left South Africa at a
disadvantage in treating people with HIV/AIDS, as its economy was too small to provide jobs that would
enable people to aﬀord costly medicines.94 The country’s patent laws were too strong for the country to
easily manufacture cheap, generic AIDS medicines, as countries like Brazil, India and Thailand have been
able to do.95 Furthermore, partly due to the diﬃculties of administering the state using a bureaucratic
apparatus inherited from the apartheid regime, the ANC government failed to adequately respond to the
HIV/AIDS crisis when it was in an incipient stage.96 Others factors, such as the reluctance of the country’s
leaders to candidly address the scope of the problem greatly contributed to the problem. Mandela himself was
reluctant to publicly address the AIDS/HIV crisis and never uttered the word “AIDS” in public while he was
president.97 President Thabo Mbeki, who was elected to succeed Mandela in 1999, has raised controversy by
89See AIDS in Africa Website, supra note 1.
90See AIDS in Africa Website, supra note 3.
91See AIDS in Africa Website, supra note 4.
92See Jon Jeter, Global Issues Dog S. Africa on AIDS, Wash. Post, Apr. 20, 2001, p. A01 [hereinafter Global Issues Dog S.
Africa].
93See id.
94See id.
95See id.
96See Jon Jeter, S. Africa’s Advances Jeopardized by AIDS, Wash. Post, July 6, 2000, p. A01.
97See Andrew Maykuth, Companies Challenge Inﬂux of Generic AIDS Drugs, Philadelphia Inquirer, Mar. 7, 2001, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWS File.
20publicly denying that HIV causes AIDS as well as questioning the eﬀectiveness of AIDS medications. Mbeki
has also championed government research into a bogus AIDS cure called Virodene.98
B. 15(C) of the Medicines and Related Substances Act
In an attempt to “rationalise the use of our limited resources and to thereby
extend the reach of our health services,” the South African government embarked on a review of drug policy
in 1996. This review resulted in the ﬁnalization of amendments to the Medicines and Related Substances
Act (“Medicines Act”) in October 1997. South Africa’s patent laws are codiﬁed in the Medicines and
Related Substances Act. The amendments to the Medicines Act addressed a range of issues, including
the streamlining of registration and regulation procedures, the creation of secure and eﬃcient methods of
distribution, and the “rational” prescribing and dispensing of drugs.99 On December 12, 1997, President
Mandela signed the amendments into law.100 Under Section 15(C) of the Medicines and Related Substances
Control Act , “the minister [of health] may prescribe conditions for the supply of more aﬀordable medicines
in certain circumstances so as to protect the health of the public,” and in particular may, under Section
15(C)(a) do the following:
notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Patents Act,
1978 (Act No. 57 of 1978), determine that the rights with regard to
any medicine under a patent granted in the Republic shall not extend
to acts in respect of such medicine which has been put onto the market
by the owner of the medicine, or with his or her consent101
98See id.
99South Africa Comments to WHA Executive Board on Drug Strategy (visited March 10, 2002)
<http://lists.essential.org/pharm-policy/msg00005.html> [hereinafter South Africa Comments].
100Consumer Project on Technology, Appendix B: Time-line of Disputes over Compulsory Licensing and Parallel Importation
in South Africa, Version 1.03 (August 5, 1999) (visited Apr. 12, 2002)
<http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/sa∼timeline.txt> [hereinafter Timeline of Disputes].
101Text of Amendment 15(C) to South Africa’s Medicines and Related Substances Act, (visited Mar. 10, 2002)
<http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/pharm-policy/2001-January/000607.html> [hereinafter Text of Amendment 15(C)].
21Various scholars, the U.S. Congress, and some European countries have interpreted this provision to allow for
compulsory licensing, as well as a full-scale infringement of patent rights.102 The media has also taken this
viewpoint. Some interpret this provision as giving the Minister the power to permit compulsory licensing of
pharmaceuticals, so long as the product was initially marketed by the owner or with the owner’s consent,
but without any other express limitation.103 They read this provision as empowering the Minister of Health
to “compel a particular drug’s patentholder to license another company to produce its drugs, if that can be
done cheaper than buying them from the patentholder,” provided the drug was initially marketed by the
patentee or with the patentee’s consent, and the drug does not have other expressed restrictions.104
However, others read 15(C)(a) in a more limited fashion. According to South Africa’s Minister of Health
at the time, Dr. Nkosazana Zuma, 15(C)(a) is aimed at permitting parallel imports of medicines.105 The
contentious part of Section 15(C)(a) is the statement that pharmaceutical patent rights “shall not extend
to acts in respect of such medicine which has been put onto the market” (emphasis added). Interpreted
literally, this law denies patent holders any beneﬁts of patent protection once they begin to sell their drugs
onto the market and allows the Minister of Health to authorize production of a drug that is an exact copy of
the patented product. This means that the Minister of Health can choose to abrogate patent rights whenever
the Minister deems it to be in the best interest of the public’s health.
According to James Love, an activist with the organization Consumer Project on Technology, the Minister
and Directors of Health have indicated that earlier proposals for compulsory licensing were considered, but
were later dropped from the regulations. According to Love, the new proposed regulations for the African
102Donald G. McNeil, Jr., South Africa’s Bitter Pill for World’s Drug Makers, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1998, at Section 3, page
1.
103See Nash, supra note 58, at 492.
104See Rosalyn S. Park, Note: The International Drug Industry: What the Future Holds for South Africa’s HIV/AIDS
Patients, 11 Minn. J. Global Trade 125, 136 n. 80 (2002).
105See McNeil, supra note 102, at 1.
22Medicines Act, announced on June 4, 2001, also do not provide for compulsory licensing, or for other ways
to authorize the import of generic equivalents of drugs protected by patent in South Africa.106 However, it is
clear that some have interpreted 15(C)(a) to allow for compulsory licensing. Some oﬃcials within the South
African government have expressed this view as well. In comments made by South Africa to WHA Executive
Board on Revised Drug Strategy, the government “passed legislation to enable South Africa to parallel import
pharmaceuticals and to allow for the issuing of non-exclusive compulsory licenses.”107 On balance, 15(C)(a)
does seem to empower the government of South Africa to issue compulsory licenses, although it is not clear
why the drafters of the legislation did not use more precise language.
Section 15(C)(b) of the new law explicitly reverses the prohibition on parallel imports contained in the 1978
Patents Act of South Africa. It allows the minister to do the following:
prescribe the conditions on which any medicine which is identical in
composition, meets the same quality standard and is intended to have
the same proprietary name as that of another medicine already
registered in the Republic, but which is imported by a person other
than the person who is the holder of the registration certiﬁcate of the
medicine already registered and which originates from any site of
manufacture of the original manufacturer as approved by the council
in the prescribed manner, may be imported.108
Under this section, “a medicine which is available abroad” and which is “identical to one registered by the
same manufacturer in South Africa” need not be the subject of a separate registration and may therefore be
imported and sold in competition with the medicine which is the subject of the local registration.109 This
106Statement by James Love (visited April 1, 2002) <http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/>.
107See South Africa Comments, supra note 99.
108Text of Amendment 15(C), supra note 101.
109See Tony Hooper, Peter Davies, The Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Bill (B30-97) and Its Eﬀect
on Intellectual Property Rights <http://www.spoor.co.za/lib/genericdrugs.html>, cited in David Benjamin Snyder, Comment:
South Africa’s Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act: A Spoonful of Sugar or a Bitter Pill to Swallow?,
18 Dick. J. Int’l L. 175, 187 n. 83 (1999).
23provision is aimed at increasing local price competition and lowering prices by allowing parallel importation,
or the importation of drugs from other countries where they are cheaper. This section also allows the Minister
of Health to threaten to begin parallel importation of a manufacturer’s drugs from other countries if the
local prices do not conform with rates abroad.110
C. Legality of 15(C) under TRIPS
Many commentators believe that these legislative changes are legal under TRIPS. While there is divided
opinion as to whether 15(C)(a) refers to compulsory licensing or parallel imports, this paper will interpret
15(C)(a) as a compulsory licensing provision. This interpretation is ﬁtting because most commentators,
including journalists and academics, have read 15(C) to allow for compulsory licensing. Also, 15(C)(b) is
clearly a parallel importing provision, and thus if 15(C)(a) refers to parallel importing instead of compulsory
licensing, then the legality of 15(C)(a) would be addressed anyway in the discussion of the legality of 15(C)(b)
under TRIPS.
The compulsory licensing provision of the Medicines Act is not invalid per se under TRIPS. The Act’s
provision is less restrictive than TRIPS, and it does not speciﬁcally address the conditions required under
TRIPS’ compulsory licensing provision. However, the Act’s ambiguous wording could be construed to be
both in accordance with or in conﬂict with TRIPS. If, for instance, the Minister of Health interprets the
Act within the context of TRIPS, and abides by the conditions described in Article 31 of TRIPS, then the
compulsory license would not violate TRIPS. If, however, the Minister of Health enforced a compulsory
licensing provision in the absence of any prior attempt to obtain the license on reasonable commercial terms,
without a licensing fee, or without the possibility of judicial review, then the compulsory license would be
valid under the Act but would violate TRIPS.111
110See Jacob Dlamini, Erwin Defends Drugs Law, Suggests WTO Intervention, Bus. Day (S. Afr.), Oct. 22, 1997, at 2, cited
in Snyder, supra note 109, at 187 n. 86.
111See Nash, supra note 58, at 494.
24TRIPS fails to explicitly permit parallel importing, although some commentators believe that TRIPS permits
this practice of purchasing goods in a foreign market and later reselling them in the domestic market. In the
absence of a clear statement on parallel importing, the Act’s provision on parallel importing is legal under
TRIPS. Parallel importing remains an entirely domestic legal concern and the South African government is
free to enact any parallel importation scheme that it chooses.112
Thus, provided the Minister of Health issues compulsory licenses within the restrictions set forth in the
TRIPS Agreement, then neither the compulsory licensing provision nor the parallel imports provision of
the Medicines Act violates TRIPS. Both can be interpreted to be consistent with TRIPS, as TRIPS allows
for compulsory licensing under Article 31, parallel imports under Article 6, as well as some ﬂexibility with
patent laws under Articles 8, 27, and 30.
IV. The United States Response to 15(C) of the Medicines Act
There were two aggressive international responses to 15(C) of the Medicines and Related Substances Act.
One was the direct application of U.S. government pressure on the South African government to change the
law or to limit its scope. The other was a lawsuit brought by nearly 40 pharmaceutical companies in a South
African court against the South African government. Both these responses were related. The pharmaceutical
companies were inﬂuential in determining the response of the U.S. government, and the U.S. withdrawal of its
original opposition to 15(C) contributed to the withdrawal of the pharmaceutical companies’ lawsuit. This
section will focus on each response separately in order to understand and describe the eﬀects of international
112See id.
25pressures on the relevant actors. The U.S. response was not the only diplomatic response to the law. Other
countries, such as some in Western Europe, also applied diplomatic pressure against the law. This section,
however, will focus on the U.S. response because of the disproportionate inﬂuence of the U.S. government
on South Africa.113
A. Opposition to the Law
The response to the lawsuit on the part of pharmaceutical companies and the U.S.
government was swift. Pharmaceutical companies contacted legislators as well as the United States Trade
Representative (“USTR”) to apply pressure on South Africa to change the law to comply with pharmaceutical
patents. Congress responded to these pressures. In early 1999, for instance, Rep. Rodney P. Frelinghuysen
(R.-N.J.) sponsored a successful eﬀort to cut oﬀ aid to South Africa until the State Department submitted
a report on the government’s “assiduous, concerted campaign” to repeal the South Africa law.114 Congress
made future aid to South Africa dependent on the Secretary of State’s issuance of a report summarizing
U.S. government eﬀorts to work with South Africa to have the Act repealed.115 Public Law 105-277 from
the 105th Congress provided that:
113See United States Department of State, U.S. Government Eﬀorts to Negotiate the Repeal, Termination, or With-
drawal of 15(C) of the South African Medicines and Related Substances Act of 1965 (visited Apr. 15, 2002)
<http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/stdept-feb51999.html> [hereinafter State Department Report] (ﬁnding that “European
Governments preferred to let the US Government take the lead in demarching the South African Government on pharmaceutical
patent protection” but that “French President Chirac raised France’s concerns during his July 1998 state visit to South Africa
and the Swiss and German presidents also raised the issue privately with Deputy President Mbeki”).
114See Barton Gellman, Gore in Conﬂict of Health and Proﬁt, Washington Post, May 21, 2000, at A1 [hereinafter Gore in
Conﬂict].
115See Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681,
2681-155 (1998). Cited in Nash, supra note 58, at 496.
26None of the funds appropriated under this heading may be made available for assistance
for the government of South Africa, until the Secretary of state reports in writing to the
appropriate committees of the Congress on the steps being taken by the United States
Government to work with the Government of the Republic of South Africa to negotiate the
repeal, suspension, or termination of section 15(C) of South Africa’s Medicines and Related
Substances Control Amendment Act No. 90 of 1997.116
The U.S. position towards the law, cogently expressed in a State Department report, was that the law was inappropriately “ambiguous.” According to the report, “Article 15(C) seems to permit the South African Minister of Health to abrogate pharmaceutical patent rights and permit parallel importation of patented pharmaceutical products.”117
The report conceded that South African government oﬃcials gave assurances that “there was no intention to use the authority of 15(C) to abrogate patents.”118
Nevertheless, the report found that “provisions of 15(C) authorize action clearly inconsistent with South Africa’s obligations under TRIPS” and it called on the government “to amend the oﬀending provisions of the law, or at the very least, to ensure that the law is implemented in a manner fully consistent with South Africa’s TRIPS obligations.”119
The statement also asserted that “under the terms of the TRIPS agreement, disputes related to parallel importation are not subject to WTO dispute settlement procedures.”120
The report stated that a broad-based coalition of federal government agencies were engaged in a campaign against the law:
All relevant agencies of the U.S. Government – the Department of State together with the
Department of Commerce, its U.S. Patent and Trademark Oﬃce (USPTO), the Oﬃce of
the United States Trade Representative (USTR), the National Security Council (NSC) and
the Oﬃce of the Vice President (OVP) – have been engaged in an assiduous, concerted
campaign to persuade the Government of South Africa (SAG) to withdraw or modify the
provisions of Article 15(C) that we believe are inconsistent with South Africa’s obligations
and commitments under the WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights. (emphasis added)121
Attempts by the pharmaceutical industry to voice their concerns to USTR,
which began even before formal passage of the law, also began to pay oﬀ. On April 30, 1998, the USTR
designated South Africa a Special 301 “watch list” country during USTR’s annual review of intellectual
property protection.122 Section 301 threatens trade sanctions against any trade partner that fails to provide
“adequate and eﬀective protection of intellectual property rights” or denies “fair and equitable market
access to United States persons who rely upon intellectual property protection.”123 The USTR must list
117See State Department Report, supra note 113.
118See id.
119See id.
120See id.
122See Patrick Bond, Globalization, Pharmaceutical Pricing, and South African Health Policy: Managing Confrontation with
U.S. Firms and Politicians, 29 Int’l J. Health Services, 765, 771 (1999).
123Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 301-09. 88 Stat. 1978, 2041 (1975) (amended by Omnibus Trade and Competi-
27such suspect countries within thirty days of issuing its yearly National Trade Estimate Report and must
subsequently investigate these countries.124 Investigation of a country can also be precipitated at the request
of an interested party, often a trade group that claims its intellectual property rights have been violated in the
country in question. Countries are classiﬁed as 1) priority watch countries (for the most egregious violations;
2) priority watch list countries (for lax protection of intellectual property); or 3) watch list countries (for
minor violations). Investigations are intended to lead to negotiations, but USTR may increase import duties
or impose other restrictions on imports if a priority country does not later its intellectual property policies.125
The USTR decision to designate South Africa a “watch list” country was based largely on the impact of 15(C)
“not only in the South African market but also due to its global precedent and the undermining of WTO
principles.”126 The USTR report dated April 30, 1999 included the following: “South Africa’s Medicines Act
appears to grant the Health Minister ill deﬁned authority to issue compulsory licenses, authorize parallel
imports, and potentially otherwise abrogate patent rights.”127 The report called on the South African
government to do the following:
We call on the Government of South Africa to bring its [intellectual property rights] regime
into full compliance with TRIPS before the January 1, 2000 deadline ...and clarify that the
powers granted in the Medicines Act are consistent with its international obligations and
will not be used to weaken or abrogate patent protection.128
In the previous year, trade oﬃcials at the USTR had already placed South Africa on a “watch list” of countries
known to disregard intellectual property rights. The State Department, USTR, and the Department of
Commerce also decided to withhold preferential tariﬀ treatment for certain South African exports. On June
tiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107, 1164 (codiﬁed in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C. (1988)). Cited in
Sweeney, supra note 62, at footnote 129.
12419 U.S.C. 2412(b)(2)(A).
12519 U.S.C. 2242(b)(2)(B), (f)(2)(A).
126See State Department Report, supra note 113.
127See United States Trade Representative, 1999 Report of the United States Trade Representative
<http://www.ustr.gov/releases/1999/04/99-41.html>. Cited in Nash, supra note 58, at 495 n. 61.
2830, 1998, the White House announced that four items, for which South Africa had requested preferential
tariﬀ treatment under the Generalized System of Preferences (“GSP”) program, would be held in abeyance
pending “adequate progress on intellectual property protection in South Africa.”129 The United States
adamantly opposed the Medicines Act’s deference to the South African Health Minister, condemning the
Minister’s “sweeping authority to abrogate patent rights for pharmaceuticals.”130
During the August 1998 U.S.-South Africa Binational Commission meetings in Washington, Vice President
Gore made intellectual property protections of pharmaceutical patents a key issue in his discussions with
Deputy President Thabo Mbeki. They agreed on a government-to-government negotiated solution, and the
USTR was chosen to lead the U.S. government’s negotiation eﬀorts.131 Suspended GSP beneﬁts would be
restored as the negotiations made progress.132
During the fall of 1998, the South African parliament drafted and considered a new medicines law that
would replace the existing Medicines Act, including the amendments that the United States found to be
objectionable. In spite of U.S. objections to 15(C) of the Act, the parliament passed a bill with provisions
identical to 15(C) in November 1998.133
129See State Department Report, supra note 113. See also Sweeney, supra note 62 (explaining that under the GSP, the
President has discretion to grant duty-free treatment to “any eligible article from a beneﬁciary developing country. Among
other things, the president considers whether the beneﬁciary developing country is providing adequate and eﬀective means
under its laws for foreign nationals to secure, to exercise, and to enforce exclusive rights in intellectual property.)
130See Gary G. Yerkey, USTR Says South Africa Agrees to Provide WTO-Consistent Patent Protection for Drugs, 16 Int’l
Trade Rep (BMA) 1541, 1541 (Sept. 22, 1999).
131See Gore in Conﬂict, supra note 114.
132See State Department Report, supra note 113.
133See id.
29B. Change in the Position of the United States Government
The United States government’s position was clear: it opposed the amendments and wanted the South
African government to change them or at least to clarify that they would be administered in a manner that
complies with TRIPS. However, from the beginning of the latter half of 1998 and accelerating into 1999,
“a surge of activism” emerged in Congress and the administration that would change U.S. trade policy and
elevate U.S. rhetorical and ﬁnancial commitments to battling HIV/AIDS overseas.134 This policy change
occurred partly in response to widespread public and international support for the developing nation’s eﬀorts
to increase access to drugs.
While initially Gore represented the interests of pharmaceutical companies in negotiations with the South
African government, he was among the earliest to break with the position of the pharmaceutical lobby.135
There were signs that senior policymakers within the Clinton administration were focusing more on the
AIDS issue and were coming to favor wider access to HIV/AIDS drugs, even at the expense of intellectual
property rights.136 Internal debates on how to approach the South African legislation were arising, and the
coalition within the U.S. government opposing 15(C) of the Medicines Act was beginning to disintegrate.
In March 1999, for instance, the USTR, backed by Commerce and State, proposed to escalate the dispute
with South Africa to the “priority watch list.” A step closer to formal sanctions, this designation is regarded
as punitive in itself because it sends a no-conﬁdence signal to foreign investors.137 Gore, however, combined
forces with the National Security Council staﬀ and public health authorities to squash that proposal.138
There was recognition within the U.S. government that its position on compulsory licensing was not reﬂected
in TRIPS. At meetings in Geneva sponsored by activist organizations Consumer Project on Technology and
134Morrison, supra note 8, at 19.
135See Gore in Conﬂict, supra note 114, at A1.
136See id.
137See id.
138See id.
30Doctors Without Borders, Lois Boland, representing the U.S. Patent and Trademark Oﬃce, acknowledged
that the government’s position on compulsory licensing exceeded the minimum requirements set forth under
TRIPS:
The fact that [the USG] view is not reﬂected in the TRIPS agreement, in the multilateral
context, is fully acknowledged. In our bilateral discussions, we continue to regard the
TRIPS agreement as an agreement that establishes minimum standards for protection and,
in certain situations, we may, and often do, ask for commitments that go beyond those
found in the TRIPS agreement.139
In June of 2000, the United States and South Africa achieved a settlement on the dispute. Under this settlement deal, South Africa would “reaﬃrm” its commitment to international patent laws and the United States would withdraw its objections to the Medicines Act.140
A statement issued by the South African Department of Trade and Industry clariﬁed the position of the South African government towards the law:
It is the express position of the South African Government that, in the implementation
of provisions of the Medicines Act - which permits parallel importation and compulsory
licensing of patents for pharmaceuticals - it will honour its obligations under the TRIPS
Agreement.141
The USTR announced that it would consult with the U.S. Secretary for Health and Human Services on
intellectual property-related trade claims to see its opinion on health considerations.142 According to a
public statement issued by the USTR:
...the two governments have identiﬁed common ground with respect to South Africa’s
implementation of its so-called Medicines Act ...the United States very much appreciates
South Africa’s assurance that, as it moves vigorously forward to bring improved health care
to its citizens, it will do so in a manner consistent with international commitments and that
fully protects intellectual property rights ...this will enable U.S. to set aside this issue from
our bilateral trade agenda. Moreover, once GSP is re-authorized by Congress, new GSP
beneﬁts granted to South Africa in June 1998 will be implemented.143
In connection with this announcement, the USTR removed South Africa from its Section 301 “watch list.”
This announcement followed the USTR’s decision, under pressure from Vice President Gore, to reduce
140See Gore in Conﬂict, supra note 114.
142The Protection of Intellectual Property and Health Policy, Oﬃce of the United States Trade Representative, USTR Press
Release 99-97, Dec. 1, 1999, cited in Frederick M. Abbott, Report: TRIPS in Seattle: The Not-So-Surprising Failure and the
Future of the TRIPS Agenda, 18 Berk. J. Int’l Law 165, 172 n. 39 (2000).
31pressure on South Africa because of its liberal parallel importing and compulsory licensing provisions.144
C. Examining the Impetus for Change
Norm entrepreneurs — consumer interest groups and public health advocates — played a critical role in
prompting the about-face in the U.S. government’s position. In the ﬁrst stage of norm emergence, norm
entrepreneurs and their organizations usually strive to “secure the support of state actors to endorse their
norms.”145 In accordance with norm theory’s assertion that “to challenge existing logics of appropriateness,
activists may need to be explicitly ‘inappropriate,”’146 AIDS activists used dramatic protest tactics in order
to capture the attention of the Clinton administration and to inﬂuence the U.S. policy change.
In June 1999, for instance, AIDS activists began tormenting Gore’s campaign with showers of printed “blood
money” and banners charging “Gore’s Greed Kills.”147 The same week that Clinton administration withdrew
its two years of objections to the law, Gore announced his candidacy for presidency. At this particular speech
in Carthage, Tennessee, AIDS activists used guerilla tactics to inﬁltrate the crowd with noisemakers and
banners, and they repeated the performance for the following two days after Gore announced his candidacy.148
Some allege that this settlement between USTR and South Africa was a result of highly visible protest tactics
that placed political pressure on Gore at a sensitive political moment, immediately prior to his declaration
of candidacy for the president.149 While it is not clear whether the protests led directly to the change
in U.S. policy — Gore oﬃcials assert the change was motivated by principles and not political whim150
— it is clear that norm entrepreneurs strategically used democratic techniques of protest and deliberation
to pressure government oﬃcials to adopt their norm. Gore’s campaign oﬃcials were taking the opinions
144See Abott, supra note 142, at 173.
145See Finnemore and Sikkink, supra note 13, at 900.
146See id. at 897.
147See Gore in Conﬂlict, supra note 114, at A1.
148See id.
149See id.
150See id.
32of activists into consideration. At one of Gore’s speeches in New Hampshire, Gore’s campaign manager
Donna Brazile plunged into the crowd of protestors and asked Paul Davis of ACT-UP Philadelphia for his
phone number.151 Activists, including Davis and others, later held back-to-back meetings at the White
House and at Gore 2000 headquarters.152 Also, NGO activities played a critical role in framing the issue to
bring the issue of public health into the forefront of the debate. USTR Representative Charlene Barshefsky
acknowledged that NGO activism spurred a change in attitudes: “Largely it was the activities of ACT-UP
and the AIDS activists that galvanized our attention [to the fact] that there was an absolute crisis,” she
said. Until then, Barshefsky asserted, “ In years past, this [pharmaceutical] issue was treated purely as a
trade issue and not an intellectual property rights issue.”153
The U.S. government’s policy change was also a response to changing sentiments amongst its domestic
population, who were learning more about the HIV/AIDS crisis due to increased coverage by the major media.
Domestic polls revealed support among the American population for expanded international HIV/AIDS
programs.154
D. Institutionalization of the Norm in U.S. Policy Towards South Africa
Norm entrepreneurs’ vigorous eﬀorts to bring public attention to the severity of the HIV/AIDS crisis, as well
as broad coverage of the situation in South Africa in the media, prompted a change in U.S. policy, and the
norm of wide access to drugs quickly became institutionalized in U.S. statements and laws. According to
norm theory, institutionalization of the norm in speciﬁc rules contributes to the possibility of a norm cascade,
which is the second stage in norm theory, by “clarifying what, exactly, the norm is and what constitutes
151See id.
152See id.
153See id..
154Morrison, supra note 8, at 21.
33violation.”155
At a speech President Clinton made at the December 1999 WTO meeting in Seattle, for instance, he said that
the United States will “implement... trade policies in a manner that ensures ...the poorest countries won’t
have to go without medicine they so desperately need.”156 The Clinton administration institutionalized the
norm, not only in its political rhetoric, but also in its laws.
On May 10, 2000, Clinton signed Executive Order 13155, entitled “Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceutical
and Medical Technologies.” E.O. 13155 was one of the clearest signs of the institutionalization of the norm
in U.S. law. The E.O. provides the following:
In administering sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, the United States shall not seek,
through negotiation or otherwise, the revocation or revision of any intellectual property law
or policy of a beneﬁciary sub-Saharan African country, as determined by the President, that
regulates HIV/AIDS pharmaceuticals or medical technologies157
This means that sub-Saharan African countries are protected from U.S. trade retaliation. The E.O. enumer-
ated two conditions for this protection: ﬁrst, the law must promote access to HIV/AIDS pharmaceuticals
or medical technologies; second, the law or policy must provide adequate and eﬀective intellectual property
protection consistent with TRIPS.158 However, the U.S. government retains the capacity to express concerns
about such laws or policies and to consult or with the foreign government on whether such laws or policies
meet the conditions of the E.O. Furthermore, the order does not prohibit the government from invoking the
WTO dispute settlement procedures to examine whether any such law or policy is consistent with TRIPS.159
Clinton later stated that this order does not undermine the protection of pharmaceutical patent rights.160
155See Finnermore and Sikkink, supra note 13, at 900.
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34This was a clear articulation of the new norm as well as a major change in U.S. policy. The United States
had previously used trade sanctions to successfully pressure Thailand to change its law, and had attempted
to use such sanctions to persuade South Africa.161 In the State Department report on the South African law
issued one year before in February 1999, the State Department warned that intellectual property violations
by the South African government would be met with further trade sanctions: “Should there be an actual
violation of any U.S. pharmaceutical patent right (e.g., patent abrogation) this Administration will respond
forcefully in accordance with appropriate trade remedy legislation (emphasis added).”162 Indeed, it was
common practice for the U.S. government to use Section 301 and GSP preferences to pressure developing
countries to increase intellectual property protections,163 but E.O. 13155 was committing the U.S. to take a
diﬀerent course in South Africa. After years of using trade sanctions to pressure South Africa to strengthen
its intellectual property laws, the U.S. government had now promised to refrain from using such pressures.
When the United States ﬁrst responded to 15(C) of the Medicines and Related Substances Act, it acknowl-
edged that its position was based on standards higher than those contained in TRIPS, and that, even if
compulsory licensing and parallel imports were legal under TRIPS, the United States was free to argue for
a higher standard. The U.S. position was that TRIPS set forth only a minimum standard which, in this
context, the United States was free to surpass. In E.O. 13155, however, Clinton set forth a diﬀerent version
of the U.S. position. He called for compliance with the minimum standards contained in TRIPS—nothing
more and nothing less.
In early 2001, the Bush administration agreed to follow Clinton’s policy. In spite of the request of the
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (“PhRMA”) that the government ﬁle a Section 301
case against South Africa, the Bush administration removed South Africa from the Section 301 “watch list”
stating that the United States will not initiate sanctions against developing countries combating the AIDS
161See Sweeney, supra note 109, at 460.
162See State Department Report, supra note 113.
163See Sweeney, supra note 109, at 459.
35epidemic.164 Several interest groups supported this position; for example, the AFL-CIO wrote the USTR
a letter in March 2001 to urge the USTR to resist PhRMA’s request to place South Africa on the “watch
list.”165 Oﬃcials announced that the Bush administration would not seek trade sanctions against developing
countries that try to force down the price of patented anti-AIDS drugs by legalizing the importation or man-
ufacture of generic versions. The administration announced that it would not try to punish such countries
even if American drug makers complain or United States patent laws are broken, provided that the country
adheres to TRIPS.166 In an informal statement by USTR oﬃcials on February 20, 2001:
The HIV/AIDS crisis is a terrible tragedy for countries, families and
individuals. USTR is not considering a change in the present ﬂexible
policy. Consistent with our overall eﬀort to protect America’s
investment in intellectual property, USTR will seek to contribute to
Administration eﬀorts to work with countries that develop serious
programs to prevent and treat this horrible disease.167
V. Response by Pharmaceutical Companies to 15(C) of the Medicines Act
The U.S. response coincided with an aggressive response from the pharmaceutical industry. Just as norm
entrepreneurs used various tactics in a concerted campaign to inﬂuence the U.S. position on 15(C), they
waged a similar campaign regarding the pharmaceutical industry’s legal oﬀensive against 15(C). They spread
information in the press and on the Internet, collected signatures, and even expressed their opinion to judicial
tribunals in order to express norms contrary to those articulated by pharmaceutical companies. And just as
the norm entrepreneurs’ eﬀorts helped spur an institutionalization of the norm in the United States, their
164Rachel L. Swarns, AIDS Drug Battle Deepens in South Africa, NY Times, Mar. 8, 2001, at A1, cited in Bass, supra note
25, at 212 n. 148-9.
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36eﬀorts to mobilize public sentiment and to spread information increased pressure on the industry to withdraw
its legal oﬀensive. Clearly, norm entrepreneurs were changing the landscape of international norms.
A. Pharmaceutical Companies vs. the South African Government
Pharmaceutical companies were concerned about 15(C) even before it formally became law. Beginning in May
1997, prominent ﬁgures in the pharmaceutical industry, including Aldridge Cooper of Johnson & Johnson and
Harvey Bale of PhRMA, the industry lobby, began writing to USTR’s oﬃce and Commerce Secretary William
Daley to denounce Pretoria’s proposed amendments to the Medicines Act.168 What would become a three-
year long legal tussle began in early 1998, when, upon enactment of the Medicines Act, the Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers’ Association (PMA) of South Africa brought a lawsuit in Pretoria High Court against the
South African government on behalf of forty domestic and international pharmaceutical companies, including
Alcon Laboratories, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Eli Lilly, and Merck.169 The suit named South Africa as
the defendant and alleged that Section 15(C) was unconstitutional on the following grounds: it enabled the
Minister of Health to determine conditions for the supply of aﬀordable medicines without setting forth any
policy considerations or guidelines; it enabled the Minister of Health to determine the extent to which rights
under a patent shall apply irrespective of provisions of the Patents Act; and it enabled the Minister of Health
to deprive owners of intellectual property without any provision for compensation to be paid.170 Lawyers
for the drug manufacturers framed the case in terms of intellectual property rights, rather than access to
AIDS medicines.171
168See Gore in Conﬂict, supra note 114.
169The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association of South Africa, et al. vs. The President of South Africa, et
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37Why were the companies opposed to the law? Since the entire continent of Africa constituted only 1.3 percent
of the global pharmaceutical market,172 it is not likely that they were motivated by a desire to maintain
proﬁts from the African market. Rather, their underlying fear was that 15(C) would erode its markets
in U.S. and Europe, the source of most pharmaceutical proﬁts.173 Prior to bringing the lawsuit against
15(C), the South African government had been negotiating with Cipla, an Indian drug company, to obtain
AIDS drugs at a fraction of the prices currently charged by ﬁrms who hold the patents.174 Pharmaceutical
companies feared that cheap generic drugs produced in developing countries could be resold in their Western
markets, undermining the industry’s entire pricing structure and its ability to fund costly new research.175
The average cost of developing a new drug is $500 million to $880 million. 176 Companies also feared that
reducing prices or allowing for production of generics would increase pressure it faced in wealthier markets to
reduce the prices of drugs: if customers in America learned that pills that cost $10,000 for them are available
for only $700 in Africa, many were bound to demand similar discounts from the companies.177
The companies also argued that solving the HIV/AIDS crisis in South Africa required much more than improving access to drugs. They pointed to a number of other causal factors, such as reluctance of the country’s political leaders to acknowledge the severity of the AIDS. Furthermore, the companies argued that even if more drugs were provided, the country probably did not have adequate health infrastructure to distribute the goods and properly administer them. They warned that improper administration of the complicated antiretroviral cocktails could lead to the development of more resistant forms of the virus.178
One of the strongest counter-arguments to the demands for wider access was that since there is no cure for AIDS, the best solution to the crisis was to increase public education on prevention as well as to improve the infrastructure to detect AIDS.179
B. The First Round of Price CutsThe companies announced two rounds of price cuts in HIV/AIDS drugs during the duration of the lawsuit, partially in attempts to bolster its public image as well as to reduce demands for generic drugs by supplying cheaper drugs themselves.180
The ﬁrst series of price cuts occurred in April and May 2000, at around the same time of Clinton’s Executive Order and the USTR’s settlement with South Africa.181
Undoubtedly, the executives who decided to reduce prices were fully aware of the protests occurring in the United States, as well as the Clinton’s administration’s decision to withdraw its challenge to the law. In April 2000, Pﬁzer oﬀered to give away Diﬂucan, an anti-fungal medicine, to people in South Africa with AIDS.182
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38One month later, ﬁve pharmaceutical companies, Bristol-Myers Squibb, GlaxoSmithKline, Merck, Boehringer-Ingelheim, and Roche announced the establishment of the Accelerated Access Initiative, an initiative in collaboration with the United Nations to sell HIV/AIDS medicines at discounted prices to developing nations.183
The United Nations played a key role in the formation of the Accelerated Access Initiative. However, the
pharmaceutical companies had not always been willing to cooperate with international organizations. For
instance, at the ﬁrst pivotal negotiations about global access to AIDS drugs in Geneva in 1991, pharmaceu-
tical companies said they did not want to lower prices, and that it was the responsibility of governments to
ensure that those in need received necessary treatments.184 These talks ended in 1993. But soon after UN
Secretary General Koﬁ Annan called for new public-private partnerships at an AIDS summit in New York on
December 6, 1999, mid-level executives of pharmaceutical companies began drafting a set of principles that
could guide an AIDS treatment initiative. Their draft statement set forth ﬁve conditions that eventually
constituted the core of the Accelerated Access Initiative joint statement that would be issued with the UN in
May 2000. The ﬁve conditions began with a requirement that recipient countries make an “unequivocal and
ongoing political commitment.”185 International agencies would have to assume responsibility for building
up health care infrastructure capable of monitoring patients and their compliance with dosing schedules.
Drugs would be sent only into an “eﬃcient, reliable and secure distribution system” to prevent interruptions
of treatment and diversion of products to other markets.186 The companies were willing to acknowledge
that “aﬀordability is an issue in developing countries” if UN agencies agreed that AIDS drug treatment was
“a shared responsibility of all sectors of society.”187 Finally, the ﬁrms wanted support from all concerned
for “adequate and enforced intellectual property rights” to “provide the prospect of a satisfactory return on
Point].
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39investment in the high-risk search for new medicines.188
The companies were willing to reduce prices; they would not, however, compromise their intellectual property
rights, and the preservation of these rights in paragraph 5 were a condition for the initial price reductions.
On April 14, 2000, leaders of the ﬁve companies and ﬁve agencies (UNAIDS, the World Health Organiza-
tion, United Nations Children Fund or UNICEF, the World Bank, and the United Nations Population Fund)
gathered for the ﬁrst time to discuss the terms of the price reductions. The statement was issued in May,
and was similar to the draft statement originally written by pharmaceutical executives.189
These announcements were accompanied by press packages and much rhetorical ﬂourish.190 While the phar-
maceutical companies couched the price reductions in the most positive terms, activist groups assessed the
reductions with a critical eye. They criticized the programs because the companies failed to make the price
disclosures transparent, but instead negotiated variable prices in strict conﬁdence.191 While these ﬁve com-
panies unveiled plans to sell AIDS drugs at substantial discounts to countries in Africa, the companies gave
little speciﬁc information to the public. During the eight months after the agreement, only one of the 5
companies (Glaxo Wellcome) was willing to disclose the amount of its AIDS medicines discount.192
Activists also criticized the Accelerated Access Initiative because the price reductions were not enough to
make the drugs widely accessible. Activists noted that even with the lower prices oﬀered by Bristol-Myers
and Merck, the cost would still be higher than prices of generic drugs for the three-drug combination com-
monly used in the developed world to treat people with AIDS and HIV. Bristol-Myers proposed a $1 a day
per-patient price for its two AIDS medicines, Zerit and Videx. Merck announced it would charge $600 per
188Id.
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40year for the protease inhibitor, Crizivan. Together, this was far more than the $350 a year price oﬀered
by generic drug manufacturers that were available in Thailand, India, and Brazil.193 The eighty percent
reduction was still inadequate to make the drugs more aﬀordable to most Africans, said some.194 World
Bank economist, Hans P. Binswanger described the programs as “expensive boutiques...available to the
lucky few.”195 Activists also criticized the limited scope of the Accelerated Access Initiative, and asked why
such eﬀorts should be limited to just South Africa.196
Norm entrepreneurs in consumer groups and other activist organizations mounted a counter-attack in re-
sponse to the oﬀensive of the pharmaceutical companies. Instead of framing the issue in terms of intellectual
property, they framed the issue in terms of human rights, and they even became directly involved in the
lawsuit. As of September 1999, implementation of the law had been suspended pending the resolution of
a constitutional challenge in the South African courts. On March 5, 2001, hearings began on the lawsuit
brought by PMA against the South African government.197 In the same month, the Pretoria High Court
ruled that it would accept evidence from the South African Treatment Action Campaign and that it would
accept the group as a “Friend of the Court.”198 AIDS activists could join the Government’s side, and the
Court acknowledged that in addition to the protection of intellectual property rights, the lawsuit involved
matters of public health and social justice.199 The South African organization, Treatment Action Cam-
paign, ﬁled an aﬃdavit in support of the South African government on April 10, 2001, along with supporting
aﬃdavits on topics such as generic substitution, parallel imports, costs of research and development by
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41pharmaceutical companies.200
C. The Second Round of Price Cuts
Pharmaceutical companies announced the second round of price cuts just days after the hearings for the
lawsuit began on March 6, 2001. Merck & Co. agreed in March 2001 to sell two of the roughly 15 medicines
used to treat HIV at drastically reduced costs. By reducing prices on Crixivan to $600 per patient per year
and $500 per patient per year for Stocrin, Merck would no longer expect to proﬁt from the sales of these
medicines in developing nations.201 On March 15, 2001, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. announced that it would
sell the two AIDS medicines it manufactures to sub-Saharan countries “below cost” and would not prevent
South Africa from ignoring patent rights it held on one of the drugs, Zerit.202 Bristol-Myers said it would
reduce the cost of Videx and Zerit to 15 cents a day for the ﬁrst and 85 cents a day for the second.203
Norm entrepreneurs, whose campaign in support of the South African government placed pharmaceutical
companies in the awkward position of defending higher prices for their products, played a key role in instigat-
ing these price reductions. For instance, Bristol-Myers’ decided to reduce the price of Zerit in direct response
to pressures from Doctors Without Borders and a group of Yale University law students.204 Initially, Bristol-
Myers had argued that it could not bypass the patent on Zerit because of an agreement with Yale University,
which developed the drug and licensed the company to manufacture and distribute it. However, in response
to pressures from Doctors Without Borders and a group of Yale University law students to make the drug
more widely available, the university reached an agreement with the company to “remove any obstacles” on
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42patent and price issues.205 Although Bristol-Myers did not relinquish its patent rights, the company pledged
not to challenge the manufacture and sale of generic equivalents in South Africa.206
It was clear from the pressure applied to Bristol-Myers and other companies that public support for greater
access to drugs was mounting. Despite the attempts of companies to improve their public image, norm en-
trepreneurs continued to portray the companies as unwilling to sacriﬁce proﬁts to save human lives. Oxfam
called on the United Nations to investigate a possible “gross breach of human rights” in the companies’ at-
tempt to “prevent the South African government from fulﬁlling its international human rights obligations.”207
And on April 17, 2001, the international medical aid organization Doctors Without Borders presented the
results of a global Internet petition campaign in which 250,000 people from over 130 countries called on
the pharmaceutical industry to drop the case. Noteworthy individuals signed the petition, including AIDS
researcher Dr. David Ho; the inventor of AIDS drug d4t, William Prusoﬀ, PhD; authors Chinua Achebe and
John Le Carr´ e; musicians Quincy Jones and Sarah McLachlan; and Members of Parliament in Canada and
in the European Parliament.208 Doctors Without Borders also joined the South African Treatment Action
Campaign and other national and international organizations in condemning the pharmaceutical industry
for pursuing a court case blocking legislation aimed at making medicines more aﬀordable in South Africa.209
Norm entrepreneurs were the most organized and vocal vanguard to voice their opposition to the PMA
lawsuit; however, there was growing indication that other inﬂuential actors were beginning to join norm
entrepreneurs in their opposition to the pharmaceutical companies’ lawsuit. In early March 2001, members
of the U.S. Congress announced their opposition to the lawsuit and introduced the Aﬀordable HIV/AIDS
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43Medicines for Poor Countries Act, a bill to promote the availability of aﬀordable HIV/AIDS medicines in the
countries of sub-Saharan Africa and other developing countries.210 Congresswoman Maxine Waters (D-CA)
personally urged the companies to drop the lawsuit:
It is unconscionable that some of the world’s wealthiest corporations are
trying to prevent an African country from manufacturing or purchasing
their own medicines. These are the very some corporations that have
steadfastly refused to make HIV/AIDS medicines available to
impoverished people in sub-Saharan Africa at reasonable prices. It is time
to let African countries take care of their people.211
Government leaders from Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium also expressed their public sup-
port for withdrawal of the lawsuit.212 On March 15, 2001, the European Parliament passed an emergency
resolution entitled Access to medicines for AIDS patients in the Third World” that called on the pharma-
ceutical companies to withdraw from the case.213 The Resolution also called on the European Commission
to “strengthen the ability of developing countries to resist the pressure to introduce more stringent patent
laws than those currently required under the WTO TRIPS Agreement”214 and also called for a review of the
TRIPS Agreement to ensure that rights of developing countries “to obtain the cheapest possible life-saving
medicines, whether patented or generic, are guaranteed.”215
D. Pharmaceutical Companies Retreat from the Lawsuit
In the three years since PMA ﬁrst commenced the lawsuit, companies had reduced prices and attempted
to refurbish their much-tarnished public image through costly commercials, advertisements, and diverse
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44humanitarian eﬀorts.216 In the same three year period, however, activities of groups opposing the lawsuit
intensiﬁed, and the lawsuit became, in the words of Kevin Watkins of Oxfam, a “public relations disaster” for
the companies as moral outrage against the companies increased.217 Due to eﬀorts of norm entrepreneurs
as well as widespread concerns among the public, the media portrayed the companies as losing a battle
laden with issues of morality and equality. The Associated Press referred to the case as “an international
battle that deeply embarrassed the companies,” and The New York Times said the companies were “feeling
pressure from a growing chorus of international critics who assailed the high prices of anti-AIDS drugs.”218
The Christian Science Monitor said the pharmaceutical companies had replaced tobacco companies as “the
corporate bad guy.”219
Recognizing that public opinion was their “ultimate regulator”220 and that they were losing the public debate,
on April 19, 2001, PMA announced that it would drop the lawsuit against the South African government.
Just as U.S. policy shifted throughout the early part of 2000, a shift in the position of pharmaceutical
companies occurred, largely in response to widespread public sentiment against the companies’ lawsuit. The
withdrawal of the suit was motivated less by legal reasons than a desire on the part of the companies to stem
the tide of moral opposition and salvage its public reputation.221
Negotiations had been underway for several months, and they ﬁnally culminated in a settlement that was
negotiated between representatives of the industry and the South African government. In withdrawing their
suit against Section 15(C) of the Medicines Control Act, the government agreed to implement its laws in
compliance with TRIPS and to write regulations putting 15(C) into eﬀect.222 The government also agreed to
embrace the ﬁrms as partners in dealing with South Africa’s health problems through the creation of a joint
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45working group with the pharmaceutical industry to examine broader health issues.223 The government also
agreed to consult with the industry on regulations regarding the implementation of the Act.224 Importantly,
the companies can still go back to court to assert their rights on a case-by case basis.225 Finally, the drug
companies agreed to pay the state’s court costs.
The pharmaceutical companies had failed in their campaign to reverse the law, as well as in their campaign to
win over public opinion. Why were the norms that the pharmaceutical companies articulated less inﬂuential
than those propounded by activists? Norm theory suggests that “intrinsic qualities about the norm itself”
can determine its inﬂuence and eventual adoption.226 According to some political scientists, norms that are
clear and speciﬁc, rather than ambiguous and complex, are more likely to be eﬀective.227 Some stress that
the substantive content of the norm, rather than its form, are more likely to determine whether it will be
successful. Norms that are particularly eﬀective are those involving bodily integrity and prevention of bodily
harm for vulnerable or “innocent” groups, especially when a short causal chain exists between cause and
eﬀect, and legal quality of opportunity.228
The norms espoused by the activists—that HIV/AIDS drugs should be more aﬀordable in order to save
millions of lives—were certainly simpler in form than the pharmaceutical companies’ insistence that price
reductions would erode their research and development funds necessary for developing future drugs. The
emotional appeal of the lack of medication causing death was stronger than the emotional appeal of the links
between patent infringement, reduction in companies’ proﬁt, and slowing innovation of new drugs. The public
was much more likely to be moved by the activists’ framing of the issue in terms of basic human survival
rather than the pharmaceutical companies’ concerns with preserving patent protection and research funds.
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46Only sophisticated populations could fully understand the pharmaceutical companies’ arguments, which
required some basic understanding of patent law as well as the enormous costs of research and development.
PMA’s withdrawal was a victory for the South African government and the activist groups. The mood
was celebratory and media generally perceived the lawsuit to be a failure on the part of pharmaceutical
companies. Activists and international organizations issued press releases celebrating the conclusion of the
legal battle, as well as a signiﬁcant step forward for other developing countries. Activists called the conclusion
of the lawsuit a “moral victory”, and South African Minister of Health Manto Tshabalala-Msimang saw the
withdrawal of the suit as part of a “broader movement for justice in healthcare—not just for South Africa,
but for the whole world.”229 Ellen Hoen of Doctors Without Borders commented that it was unlikely the
companies would bring forth a court challenge against a developing country in the future.230 Interestingly,
pharmaceutical companies also issued statements welcoming the end of the lawsuit, showing that they had
belatedly come to embrace the new norm.
VI. Institutionalization of the Emerging Norm in International Laws
The pharmaceutical companies’ retreat from the lawsuit demonstrated the companies’ de facto acceptance of
the norm. Bilateral relations between the U.S. and South Africa also institutionalized the norm. After these
two critical events—the retreat of the U.S. government and the pharmaceutical companies from their original
opposition to the law—the norm also became institutionalized in international statements and rules. For
instance, the United Nations Declaration on AIDS, which was issued by the United Nations Special Session
229Singer, supra note 219.
230Medicins Sans Frontiers Campaign for Access to Essential Medicines, Drug Companies
in South Africa Capitulate Under Barrage of Public Pressure, April 19, 2001, available at
<http://www.accessmed-msf.org/prod/publications.asp?scntid=218200141159&contenttype=PARA&> (last visited Apr.
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47on HIV/AIDS, called for national strategies and international cooperation to disseminate AIDS awareness
and prevention.231 The most critical international statement to fully articulate the norm of improved access
to life-saving pharmaceuticals was the Doha Declaration, which was negotiated by the 142 Member States
of the World Trade Organization at their annual meeting in Doha, Qatar on November 2001.232
A. Pre-Doha Events
The World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference ran from November 9 - 14, 2001 in Doha, Qatar.
Numerous norm entrepreneurs had representatives in Doha engaged in further lobbying with governments,
such as Doctors Without Borders, Oxfam, the Health GAP Coalition, and the Consumer Project on Tech-
nology.233 Many consumer and activist groups within and without the developing countries had also lobbied
their governments in concerted campaigns to inﬂuence their positions and to win support for developing coun-
tries’ proposals. For instance, the Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, in conjunction with several other
groups conducted the following activities as part of their campaign: distributed letters to key government
oﬃcials and all Members of Parliament, met with the Prime Minister and other government oﬃcials, deliv-
ered 12,000 postcards from concerned Canadians to the Prime Minister, and conducted numerous interviews
and published opinion pieces in the Press.234
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48B. Provisions of the Doha Declaration
The WTO Ministers agreed upon a “Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,” which sets
out seven paragraphs clarifying TRIPS.235
Relationship between TRIPS and Public Health Concerns
Developing countries sought a clear statement that “nothing in the TRIPS Agreement shall be used to
prevent countries from taking measures to protect public health.”236 Canada and a handful of wealthy
countries, led by the United States and Switzerland, opposed this statement.237 As a result, the main
Declaration stresses the “importance” that the Ministers attach to the interpretation and implementation
of the TRIPS Agreement “in a manner supportive of public health, by promoting both access to existing
medicines and research and development into new medicines.”238 The Declaration contains relatively strong
language about the relationship between TRIPS and public health concerns. The WTO Ministers state:
We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members from tak-
ing measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our commitment to
the TRIPS Agreement, we aﬃrm that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and
implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members’ right to protect public health and,
in particular, to promote access to medicines for all. In this connection, we reaﬃrm the
right of WTO Members to use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which
provide ﬂexibility for this purpose.239
This provision stands as a clear political statement that public health concerns should override commercial
235Doha WTO Ministerial 2001, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Nov. 20, 2001 (visited Apr. 15,
2002) <http://ww.wto.org/english/thewto e/minist e/min01 e/mindec1 trips e.htm> [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
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49interests.240 However, it does not mandate that that nothing in the TRIPS Agreement shall prevent countries
from taking measures to protect public health
Compulsory Licenses
According to the Declaration, countries can override pharmaceutical patents to gain faster, cheaper access to
medicines in situations when poor nations need access to patented drugs.241 The Declaration gives member
countries broad rights to issue a compulsory license that allows the manufacture of generic versions of a
patented drug during its patent term, provided that “each member has the right to grant compulsory licenses
and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licenses are granted.”242 These options are not
limited to emergency situations. If countries declare an emergency, however, they can issue compulsory
licenses without prior negotiation with the patent owner. It is countries themselves that will determine what
constitutes an emergency situation.243
However, the Declaration imposes the restriction that this authorization for a compulsory license must be
“predominantly” for the supply of that country’s own domestic market.244 This means that countries that
do have drug-making capacity cannot authorize anything more than a limited production of generic drugs
for export to countries that need them.245 The meeting left unresolved the issue of where countries with
insuﬃcient or no manufacturing capacity for pharmaceuticals will obtain drugs under a compulsory license.246
240Green Light to Put Health First at WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, Joint NGO Statement, by MSF, OXFAM, Third
World Network, Consumer Project on Technology, Consumers International, Health Action International and the Network,
Nov. 14, 2001 (visited Apr. 20, 2002) <http://www.oxfam.org.uk/whatnew/press/doha2.html> [hereinafter Green Light to Put
Health First].
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importation may have less appeal as a strategy to increase access to drugs, partly because of Kenya’s failed experiment with
50This was the biggest disappointment for developing countries and activists.247
The Africa Group, a coalition of more than eighty developing countries, had lobbied for a provision that
would allow generic versions of patented drugs to be exported to poor countries that do not have suﬃcient
industrial capacity to produce the drugs domestically.248 The Africa Group sought a provision authorizing
the export of medicines under Article 30 of TRIPS and sought a clariﬁcation of TRIPS that would permit
“South-South access” to medicine arrangements, where emerging developing countries, such as India or
Brazil, would be allowed to provide those least developed countries, such as those in sub-Saharan Africa,
with the medicines they need.249 Without this clariﬁcation, “South-South access” arrangements would most
likely be prohibited by Article 31(f) of TRIPS, which limits exports of medicines manufactured under a
compulsory license. Article 31(f) requires that a compulsory license be authorized “predominantly for the
use of the domestic market of the Member authorizing the compulsory license.”250 The United States, the
European Commission, and Japan opposed this proposed provision, and, as a result, it was not adopted.251
As a result, the Doha provision on compulsory licenses is of little beneﬁt to countries that do not have the
capacity to produce their own generic medicines, which are likely to include some of the countries most
in need of cheaper medicines.252 These countries must import the medicines from countries that have this
capacity. But under a compulsory license, countries that do have drug-making capacity cannot authorize
anything more than a limited production of generic drugs for export to countries that need them.253 Rather
than moving this barrier, the Doha Declaration instructs the WTO’s subsidiary body, the Council for TRIPS,
the parallel importation of drugs; Kenyan scientists had warned legislators in South Africa of the possible danger of parallel
importation, and this may have inﬂuenced South Africa’s approach).
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51“to ﬁnd an expeditious solution to this problem” and to report back before the end of 2002.254
Parallel Imports
The Doha Declaration leaves countries the freedom to decide on their own rules for implementing parallel
imports.255
Transitional Arrangements
The Declaration also provides the WTO’s least developed member countries an additional ten years until
January 1, 2016, to comply with their obligations under the TRIPS agreement.256
The legal status of the Declaration is that it is not authoritative, nor does it amend TRIPS. Rather, it
has the force of suggestion, similar to a piece of legislative history; it directs countries on how to interpret
TRIPS.257 The ﬁnal text is likely to guide the interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement in future WTO
disputes in a fashion that is more friendly to public health objectives. It will also help developing countries
fend oﬀ pressure tactics by rich countries who invoke TRIPS and threaten the use of trade sanctions when
developing countries limit companies’ exclusive patent rights.258 The Doha Declaration will be used more
as a negotiating tool, under which developing countries will threaten the issuance of compulsory licenses in
order to pressure drug companies to lower prices of drugs.
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52C. Response to the Doha Declaration
The response to the Doha Declaration by activist groups was celebratory. According to some, this was the ﬁrst time, since the signing of the WTO Agreement in 1994, that TRIPS had been interpreted in a manner that was favorable to developing countries.259
Daniel Berman of Doctors Without Borders said of the Declaration:
The threat of punitive action against a country that attempts to address its health needs
has been dramatically reduced. With this declaration it is doubtful that a wealthy country
would dare ﬁle a dispute against a developing country for using one of the safeguards such as
compulsory licensing. Now patent holders either oﬀer prices that make their drugs accessible
or risk losing their monopoly prices.260
Some activist groups heralded the Declaration as a complete victory: “From now on, the dogma of corporate
monopoly on life-saving drugs is no longer law. Governments are now free to make or import generic versions
of the drugs they need.”261
This celebratory mood was partially unwarranted. The Doha Declaration institutionalizes the norm of greater
access to pharmaceuticals. It also contains strong language favoring access to drugs and allows developing
countries greater ﬂexibility in obtaining much-needed pharmaceuticals. However, while Doha does articulate
the new norm favoring greater access to drugs, it is likely to have less determinative impact than the literal
text suggests. Developing countries’ fear of unilateral trade sanctions will keep them from issuing compulsory
licenses. Instead, however, they will use the Doha Declaration as a rhetorical stick to get pharmaceutical
companies to lower prices.
The impact of the Doha Declaration is limited by the U.S. practice of using its leverage in bilateral negotiations to discourage developing countries from exercising the latitude that the TRIPS agreement gives them.262
The U.S. government is likely to continue this practice, and thus, while compulsory licensing and parallel importing are somewhat more available than they were in the past, developing countries will not be able to use this option. Instead, developing countries will use these provisions in their negotiations with pharmaceutical companies in order to persuade the companies to reduce prices on life-saving drugs.263
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53While Executive Order 13155 clearly states that the United States will not use trade sanctions to seek the revocation or revision of any intellectual law or policy that promotes access to HIV/AIDS pharmaceuticals and complies with TRIPS, this executive order applies only to countries in sub-Saharan Africa.264
Furthermore, developing countries still face other bilateral pressures outside of the use of Section 301, such as pressure in informal diplomatic relations.
Although the Declaration has strong symbolic and rhetorical force, developing countries’ fear of unilateral
trade sanctions will keep them from issuing compulsory licenses. Instead, however, they will use Doha as
a rhetorical stick to get pharmaceutical companies to lower prices. But the Declaration does have strong
symbolic and rhetorical force; as such, it will have eﬀects and inﬂuences beyond what is in the literal text.
VII. South Africa After the Lawsuit: Has the Norm Been Internalized?
Has the norm had reached the third stage, that of norm internalization, where norms becomes so widely accepted that “they are internalized by actors and achieve a ‘taken-for-granted’ quality that makes conformance with the norm almost automactic”265? The answer is “No.” While the norm of allowing developing countries increased access to drugs passed through the ﬁrst two stages of emergence and institutionalization, it has failed to reach the third stage of norm internalization. The main proponents of the alternative norm, the pharmaceutical companies, did not face a complete loss. The international statements that clariﬁed and stated the new norm left considerable latitude for the interests of pharmaceutical companies in preserving their patents, and these statements were also general enough to allow for future debate and change. Furthermore, while the norm has been institutionalized in various forms, political obstacles within South Africa as well as other practical factors have prevented its full internalization, and many segments of the population are still unable to access aﬀordable HIV/AIDS drugs. Improving access to drugs in South Africa is not just a matter of developing an international consensus around a norm, but also requires action in the domestic political arena.
A. Government Does Not Issue Compulsory Licenses and Refuses to Declare a “National Emergency”
Following the conclusion of the pharmaceutical companies’ lawsuit, many expected great progress in terms
of improving access to drugs. The Minister of Health assured activist organizations that no concessions had
been made in the settlement with the pharmaceutical companies and that the South African government
would proceed to implement the Medicines and Related Substance Control Amendment Act.266 In response,
activist groups called on the South African government to issue compulsory licenses.267 Now is the time for
the South African government to issue compulsory licenses for HIV/AIDS drugs to generic manufacturers,
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54said Robert Weissman, co-director of Essential Action.268 Compulsory licensing permits generic competition
for on-patent products. By authorizing generic competition,” Weissman stated, “South Africa will see prices
fall dramatically and steadily and will enable those with HIV/AIDS to gain access to the medicines they
need to survive.269
After the settlement of the case, however, some activists were disappointed by the South African government’s
response. Activists called on the government of South Africa to issue the compulsory licenses needed to allow
for generic production within the country. But the government did not issue compulsory licenses, largely
due to the fear of losing the interest of foreign investors.270
President Thabo Mbkei also rejected appeals from labor unions, human rights activists, and opposition
politicians to declare a state of “national emergency” that would allow the country to issue compulsory
licenses without obtaining authorization from the patent holder.271 Despite pressures on the government
to make AIDS drugs immediately available and aﬀordable, Mbeki’s government feared that declaring a
state of emergency would worsen the country’s economic situation by scaring away foreign investors just
as the government was trying to improve economic conditions.272 While Mbeki explained his refusal to
declare an emergency by saying that South Africa’s own laws were adequate in providing wider access to
AIDS medicines, his government has been reluctant to take steps under these laws to dramatically increase
access.273
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55B. Government Interprets 15(C) in a Narrow Manner
Some activists had hoped that the government would set a precedent for the developing world by giving 15(C)
its most expansive meaning – that is, to provide an exception under which the South Africa government
could acquire cheap generic equivalents of locally patented medicines by any means possible. For instance,
James Love, director of Ralph Nader’s Washington-based Consumer Project on Technology, who had a hand
in the original drafting of 15(C), was disappointed by the country’s limited interpretation of 15(C).274 He
had hoped that under 15(C), Pretoria would issue compulsory licenses to import generic copies of drugs
made in countries like India, which does not recognize drug patents, as well as to manufacture generics in
South Africa for both domestic use and for export to other countries.275
However, he and others came to realize that the government was construing 15(C) in a more limited sense
to include only “classical” parallel importing; that is, buying medicines manufactured and packaged by the
patent holder or its designee, but outside its authorized channels.276 This type of parallel importing is
unquestionably permissible under TRIPS. Love was chagrined to ﬁnd that government itself was construing
15(C) in a much more limited way, and intended to use it only as a legal basis for “classical” parallel
importing.277
C. Government Refuses to Provide Antiretroviral Treatment
Despite the adoption of the Doha Declaration, the South African government has not used any of the available tools to reduce the price of antitretroviral therapy, and has continued to refuse to provide such treatment for people living with AIDS.278
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56Antiretroviral medicines stop HIV from reproducing in the human body, allowing people with HIV/AIDS to live longer, healthier lives.279
One tablet of the antiretroviral nevirapine taken during labor, along with a single dose for the newborn, can reduce the risk of transmission by as much as 50 percent. The pharmaceutical company, Boehringer Ingelheim, which manufactures nevirapine, oﬀered to provide the drug free to South Africa for ﬁve years.280
Yet, the government has made the drug available at only 18 pilot sites around the country, and not at public hospitals.281
Boehringer also oﬀered Nevirapine for free only for the use of mother-to-child transmission prevention in the public sector, and not as part of an antiretroviral treatment program for adults.282
The government has refused to provide nevirapine to the South African population. In December 2001, the AIDS activist organization Treatment Access Campaign sued Health Minister Manto Tshabalala-Msimang for the department’s failure to provide anti-retrovirals to poor pregnant women.283
The South African High Court found that the government was violating its constitutional obligation to improve access to health care services and to safeguard the rights of children.284
The Court ruled that South Africa must begin a nationwide nevirapine program, making the drug immediately available at health institutions with the capacity to administer it. The government will appeal the whole ruling at a hearing in May 2002. In a statement released in March 2002, the South African government referred to the doctors, politicians and advocates who were demanding the widespread distribution of AIDS drugs as supporters of “pseudoscience.”285
In early 2002, activist groups also began a campaign to bring generic drugs into South Africa from Brazil.
Doctors Without Borders contracted to purchase antiretroviral drugs produced by FarManguihos, the Brazil-
ian national pharmaceutical producer, which is part of Fiocruz, a Brazilian public research body.286 The
groups purchased and then proceeded to bring several generic drugs produced by the Brazilian company into
South Africa: AZT, 3TC, co-formulated AZT/3TC and nevirapine.287 The generic drugs produced in Brazil
were less expensive than the name-brand versions sold in South Africa. Boehringer Ingelheim sells nevirapine
to Doctors Without Borders for US$1.10 per day in South Africa. The generic version sold by the Brazilian
company, however, is only US$0.59 per day. GlaxoSmithKline oﬀered AZT and Lamivudine to the South
African government at US$2 per day, but the Brazilian company sold a generic version to Doctors Without
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57Borders for US$0.96 per day.288 Since the South African government itself did not authorize the importation
of the generic drugs into the country under its patent laws, the importing of the Brazilian drugs into the
country contravenes South Africa’s patent laws. They are, however, succeeding in bringing much-needed
drugs to those suﬀering from HIV/AIDS.
Conclusion
What began as a sad story had a potential for a happy ending. Over a short span of time, an international
consensus emerged favoring wider access to HIV/AIDS drugs for South Africa, and critical actors took historic
steps that would allow for increased availability of more aﬀordable HIV/AIDS drugs to the South African
people. The pharmaceutical companies withdrew their lawsuit against the South African government, the
U.S. government reversed its original position opposing the law, and the 140 member countries of the World
Trade Organization passed a declaration that sought to reconcile public health concerns with the provisions
in TRIPS. Activist groups on the international scene and within the country of South Africa spent countless
hours disseminating information to the media and the public, stategizing their campaigns, and lobbying key
policy-making oﬃcials.
Yet, the HIV/AIDS crisis in South Africa appears to be relatively undiminished. Although the norm of
wider access emerged and was institutionalized, it has failed to become fully internalized within the domestic
political community of the country. The activist groups who originally allied themselves with the government
against the pharmaceutical companies are now assuming an adversarial position towards the government, as
they sue the government for distributing drugs, illegally smuggle generic HIV/AIDS drugs into the country,
and demand that President Mbeki espouse positions that he fears may alarm the foreign investors with the
ﬁnancial resources the country desperately needs.
This is the current “end” to this story, a disappointing anticlimax after the hopeful emergence of a global
288Treatment Action Campaign, supra note 280.
58consensus favoring the norm of wider access. However, this does not have to be the end of the story.
Developing countries with signiﬁcant HIV/AIDS problems have taken steps to curb the rates of the epidemic
in their borders. In neighboring Botswana, where 36 percent of adults are infected with AIDS, the government
announced that it hoped to provide antiretroviral medicines by the end of 2001 to all who need it.289 Brazil’s
government decided in 1992 to manufacture its own HIV/AIDS drugs, and today, its government labs produce
generic AIDS medications for 81,000 AIDS patients at a yearly cost $400 million per year.290 South Africa’s
current government, however, may not have the ﬁnancial resources nor the political courage to take such
drastic actions. The ultimate solution to the HIV/AIDS crisis may lie in greater ﬁnancial support for the
country and its anti-AIDS programs or a dramatic change in the current political climate. Hopefully, progress
will come before it is too late for the South African people.
- THE END -
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